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Background  
 
Electricity lines businesses (“ELBs”) have been subject to regulatory control 
since 2001, following the enactment that year of Part 4A of the Commerce Act 
(“Act”).  “Thresholds”, which have served as screening devices, have been the 
centre point of this regulatory regime.  Breach of these thresholds has simply 
resulted in “please explain” consequences.  For the period 2003-07, there 
were 127 breaches of the thresholds by 27 of the 28 ELBs.  In all but a few 
cases, no further action was taken in respect of any of these breaches.  In the 
few instances where further action has been proposed, administrative 
settlements were eventually reached. 
 
Such an environment, which has often been described simplistically and 
erroneously as one of “light-handed regulation”, might be expected to have 
been embraced by the ELBs.  But instead, application of this regime has 
produced the following concerns: 
 
• Preponderant weight being attached by the Commerce Commission 
(“Commission”) to short-term wealth transfers as a benefit of 
regulation. 
• An initial capital measurement (ODV) Handbook assessment of asset 
values which do not reflect appropriate values in the case of many 
ELBs.  
• Forward-looking uncertainty in the application of ODV-based regulatory 
methodology, and about whether the Commission may switch to other 
asset valuation methodologies. 
• No ruling on a WACC methodology, notwithstanding that there has 
been a panel employed by the Commission to study this matter for 
some three years. 
• Administrative settlements which provide no meaningful precedent 
against which ELBs may assess likely outcomes of breaches of the 
thresholds. 
• Threshold and price path assessments which do not appraise whether, 
ELBs will be regulated in such a way that their credit ratings fall below 
a given rating (such as the BBB+ rating constraint under Ch 6 of the 
Australian National Electricity Rules). 
• A lack of accountability for Commission threshold and administrative 
decisions, because such decisions are not subject to merits review or 
appeals. 
 
Great Expectations 
 
Against this background, and other obvious inadequacies under the generic 
price control provisions of Part 4 of the Act, the case for reform of these 
regulatory regimes was made.  A new regulatory regime applying to ELBs will 
come into force on 1 April 2009.  These reforms are set out in the Commerce 
Amendment Bill 2008 (“Bill”), which passed its Third Reading on 5 September 
2008. 
 
Many regulated entities have welcomed the Bill, including most of the ELBs. 
These include some ELBs that will continue to be regulated.  Small consumer 
cooperative ELBs will not be regulated under the proposed Bill, although they 
will remain subject to information disclosure requirements.  
 
Primary perceived virtues of the new regulatory regime are that certainty and 
accountability will be enhanced.  We submit that on closer scrutiny, and in 
time, it will become apparent that this confidence is misplaced and that 
expectations that these goals are about to be met will not be realised.  Our 
three primary reasons for this position are as follows. 
 
Reason #1:  Dynamic efficiency considerations may continue to be 
compromised; the purpose statement remains problematic 
 
Purpose statements in Acts of Parliament are important.  They are not merely 
high level statements of principle.  Rather, in many cases they provide the 
substantive basis upon which regulatory decisions are made.  In the case of 
ELBs, the purpose statement will strongly influence the form of regulation, 
including its implementation. 
 
Currently, section 57E provides that the purpose of Part 4A is to promote the 
efficient operation of markets through targeted control for the long-term 
benefit of consumers, so as to ensure that ELBs (a) are limited in their ability 
to extract excessive profits, (b) face strong incentives to improve efficiency 
and (c) share the benefits of efficiency gains with consumers, including 
through lower prices. 
 
The new section 52A of the Bill substantively follows current section 57E.  The 
promotion of the long-term benefit of consumers is again a centre point of this 
new purpose statement.  This goal is, apparently, to be achieved by 
promoting outcomes consistent with those which may be expected in 
competitive markets such that ELBs will have incentives to innovate, invest 
and improve efficiency, will be limited in their ability to extract excessive prices 
and will share the benefits of efficiency gains with consumers (again including 
through lower prices).   
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In one sense, section 52A differs from section 57E in that there is now more 
direct reference to dynamic efficiency.  But the Commission’s deliberations to 
date under Part 4A already reflect that the Commission considers it has taken 
these factors into account.  Accordingly, we predict that section 52A has the 
potential to be applied in much the same manner as section 57E.  The 
multiplicity of goals poses potential conflict, and competing interpretations that 
include conjecture as to whether some aspect not on the list has been 
excluded deliberately.   
 
There is an inevitable tension between goals of dynamic efficiency (the long-
term benefit of consumers) and wealth transfer.  Where regulators are 
required to choose which goal is to be granted primacy, other goals may be 
compromised.  
 
Based upon decision-making trends to date under Part 4A, and other 
regulatory regimes administered by the Commission, we predict that the 
following outcomes and problems will continue to attach to the new section 
52A, as they have done under the current section 57E: 
 
• Wealth transfer assessments will continue to be an important element 
affecting how regulation will be implemented. 
 
• Wealth assessments will continue to be treated as though they are a 
benefit component of a regulatory quantitative cost-benefit analysis.  It 
will mean that the unsound Commission preoccupation with comparing 
short- to medium-term wealth transfers with medium- to long-term 
dynamic efficiency will continue. 
 
• The Commission’s analysis will almost certainly continue to not identify 
the social benefit of regulatory decisions; in large part because it is not 
able to identify the quantified assessed transfers with welfare 
improvement in society in the short term, let alone in the long term. By 
way of examples, no allowance is likely to be made for the fact that in 
many cases consumers may be producers or shareholders of regulated 
entities (including through participation in superannuation schemes), or 
the fact that the tax system relatively transparently transfers (30%) of 
corporate profits. 
 
Reason #2:  The set and implementation of the “input methodologies” will be 
problematic and uncertain; such methodologies are unlikely to deliver the 
expected outcomes 
 
There will now be no 2009 reset of the current thresholds for ELBs under 
current Part 4A.  Rather, the current thresholds, expiring on 31 March 2009, 
will be the default price-quality path applying up to 31 March 2010.  The 
critical transition in relation to this path will unfold in the course of 2009.  By 1 
December 2009, the Commission will be required to reset the price-quality 
path for regulated ELBs to apply from 1 April 2010. 
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What will this reset process be based upon?  The centre point of the new 
regulatory regime is “input methodologies”.  It is assumed that these 
regulatory input methodologies can be specified in advance of 
implementation, and that they will provide the basis for regulatory certainty on 
a forward-looking basis. 
 
Input methodologies are set out in check list form in the new section 52S.  
They include asset valuation, WACC, pricing methodologies and so on.  It is 
unclear what level of prescription is required for the input methodologies and 
concomitantly how input methodologies differ from implementation.  There is a 
requirement that they be in sufficient detail to enable the assessment of 
regulatory positions, which would require that formulation should be close to 
implementation or prescription of the final decision.  
 
Those ELBs that object to the rolled over price thresholds as their price path 
from 1 April 2010, or any other subsequent default price-quality path, have the 
option of seeking a "customised" alternative price path. While it is mandatory 
that input methodologies be set and applied to core adjudicative tasks (such 
as the assessment of customised proposals), surprisingly there is no 
requirement that specified input methodologies be taken into account in the 
reset process for the default price-quality path.  Rather, in this context, the 
Commission has, it seems, a discretion as to which input methodologies it 
may use.  The combined application of sections 54K and 52P(3)(c) means 
that in theory the Commission may be able to selectively determine which 
input methodologies may apply to the default price-quality path reset for 1 
April 2010.   
 
If the past is anything to go by, the approach the Commission uses for the set 
of default price-quality paths may not be clear and may differ somewhat 
across ELBs.  Notwithstanding that the general rule relating to price path 
resets is that there should be only one rate of change - i.e. x - factor for each 
type of regulated service, new section 53P(6) enables the Commission to set 
alternative rates of change for any particular supplier.  Accordingly, individual 
rate change assessments may be likely for each ELB. 
 
Initially, there is a time-line disjunction in the price reset process, because 
input methodologies need not be set until 30 June 2010 (or 30 December 
2010).  This means that the input methodologies will not be available until 7-
13 months after the date that the first default price-quality path is reset for 
ELBs.  The Commission may presumably endeavour to manage this 
disjunction.  For example, consultation may be expected to be well advanced 
on the input methodologies by the time that the 1 April 2010 price-quality path 
is set, and it may be predicted that the Commission will strive to keep these 
work streams in harmony. If, however, there is a disjunction between these 
two work streams, it is to some extent rectifiable where the subsequent set of 
input methodologies would result in a substantially different path to that which 
has been reset.  For this reason, we do not dwell further on this point. 
 
A matter of more considerable moment is that input methodologies are 
generally to be established in advance of their application, perhaps well in 
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advance.  The Commission is required to reset input methodologies only once 
every 7 years.  Accordingly, any given set or reset of input methodologies has 
the potential to apply to two resets of the default price-quality paths for ELBs 
over a 7 year period. 
 
These various time line problems (including time lines attaching to appeal 
rights, which we discuss below) can be highlighted in diagrammatic form, as 
follows: 
 
   
 
 
  
2008 201720122010 2014
Input Methodologies Available (30 June 2010 - 2017)
Merit Review of input methodologies available 
Customised Proposal
Default price-quality path (from 1 April 2010, reset 1/4/2015)
Default price-quality path (current thresholds: to 31 March 2010)
DEC 09 Reset decision for price-quality path
Schematic Depiction of Time Lines
1/4/ 10 1/4/ 1512/ 09
Merit Review of customised path available
 
Against this backdrop, we predict that the input methodologies will be 
problematic, and will not deliver the anticipated certainty, because: 
 
• At no point is there articulation of the expected level of prescription in 
the input methodologies. Taken literally, the requirement that input 
methodologies be in sufficient detail to enable ELBs to assess their 
regulatory position means that there cannot be a dividing line between 
the input methodology and implementation.  
 
• The level of prescription remains a matter for the sole discretion of the 
Commission.  It poses agency concerns because the Commission will 
both set and enforce the input methodologies.  The Commission may 
take differing approaches to the level of prescription for input 
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methodologies depending on their incentives in relation to appeal 
rights.  In the case of input methodology decisions, such incentives 
may lead the Commission to limit the level of prescription and increase 
the span of implementation.  This could well result in debate as to the 
adequacy of these input methodologies for regulatory guidance 
purposes.  This concern could also of itself trigger appeals, as we 
discuss later. 
 
• Further, it is simplistic to anticipate that input methodologies can be set 
in stone in advance, divorced from their implementation potentially over 
a 7 year period in the manner that is proposed.  Input methodologies 
may need to be fact intensive, and may need to account for intrinsic 
market volatility over time, in order to deliver proper outcomes and the 
desired regulatory certainty.  In short, the formulation of input 
methodologies and their subsequent implementation are not distinct 
severable tasks, as is clearly intended under the general scheme of the 
Bill.   
 
Reason #3:  Appeal rights have been fashioned in a restrictive manner and 
they will be unlikely to provide appropriate accountability 
 
Under current Part 4A, ELBs have had no ability to seek merits review or 
appeals of Commission decisions.  Against this background, the introduction 
of appeal rights has been welcomed by the industry.  But upon closer scrutiny, 
we submit that the appeal rights that are proposed are unduly restrictive and 
are unlikely to provide the accountability mechanism that may be anticipated.   
 
The appeal rights conferred under the Bill do not attach to decisions 
pertaining to the set of default price-quality paths.  Rather, they apply only in 
respect of input methodology decisions and final decisions pertaining to 
customised proposals. 
 
We deal with each of these categories of appeal in turn. 
 
Procedural and substantive concerns applying to the appeal of the input 
methodologies are present; consultation on the development of these 
methodologies notwithstanding. They are as follows: 
 
• The procedural concern attaches to the limited window of opportunity 
for these appeals.  The Commission may elect only to reset input 
methodologies once every 7 years.  The period for the appeal of such 
decisions is limited to 20 working days; hardly time to test the 
methodologies by application of them.  Thereafter, these appeal rights 
will attach only for 20 days each 7 years.     
 
• A further problem, evident from the discussion above, will be the 
subject matter of such appeals.  What level of detail, and what factual 
basis, will be exposed for appeal in this setting?  In all likelihood there 
will be inadequate information before the court to properly determine 
any such appeal.  This issue will apply at the time when appeals are 
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first available in 2010.  The problem will be all the more acute at the 
time of the next reset of the default price-quality path in 2015, because 
there will be no basis to take into account market volatilities and 
evolution occurring between 2010-2015 (unless the Commission 
unilaterally elects to reopen any given input methodology). 
 
• An allied problem is that ELBs may consider it prudent to appeal all 
input methodologies in the course of the 20 day window in July 2010, 
following the first set of such methodologies.  As customised proposal 
appeals may not relate to all or any part of input methodologies (as 
discussed below), ELBs may predictably elect to litigate at this 
preliminary point all input methodology matters that could conceivably 
be excluded from customised proposal appeals.  If a matter at issue is 
not addressed at all in an input methodology, then presumably it will 
remain open to appeal at the customised proposal stage.  But in all 
other cases where input methodologies touch upon matters which may 
potentially be in dispute at some future time, ELBs will have an 
incentive to litigate them early on at the input methodology appeal 
stage, so as to achieve the maximum certainty possible.  Without 
knowing how the Commission proposes to formulate input 
methodologies, it is difficult to advance this point further.  But it may be 
that input methodologies that lack a high degree of specificity will give 
cause for concern, because ELBs may not know if their understanding 
of these methodologies is in harmony with the views held by the 
Commission.  Accordingly, in this setting grounds for appeal may 
include that the input methodologies are in insufficient detail.  Just how 
the courts will handle such a flood gate of litigation will be another 
matter. 
 
Turning to appeals of final decisions for customised proposals, we predict that 
they will be unlikely to provide much in the way of a check and balance 
because: 
 
• There will be few applications for customised proposals.  The risks in 
submitting such proposals will be high, because once the election is 
made to go down this path, there is no ability to withdraw the 
application.  Applicants can end up worse off under the customised 
proposal path if there is a finding that the default price-quality is too 
high, for whatever reason, as the Commission can order claw back in 
relation to some or all of the over-recovery.  The time within which 
these applications will be processed (10-15 months) may act as a 
further deterrent. 
 
• Any such appeals as may be made will be seriously constrained, 
because proposed section 91(1AA) provides that such appeals may 
not include an appeal against all or any part of the input 
methodologies.  It is difficult to imagine that any appeal of a final 
customised proposal decision will not involve some aspect of an input 
methodology, and its application.  Accordingly, section 91(1AA) has the 
potential to render this appeal right redundant.  From the Commission's 
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perspective, the more detailed (the closer to implementation) it makes 
its input methodologies the less scope there will be for its decisions on 
customised proposals to be subject to merit appeal.  In this context, 
there will be ample scope for argument as to the level of detail required 
to entitle the application of section 91(1AA), as we have already 
foreshadowed.  
 
In conclusion 
 
We make three concluding points. 
 
First, some of the central concerns under the current regime are unlikely to be 
answered under the new regime.  For example, the prospect that dynamic 
efficiency concerns may be compromised remains, and constraints such as 
limits on potential credit rating outcomes of regulation are not present. 
 
Second, the centre point of the new regime, input methodologies, involves 
issues of concern in formulation and application.  These concerns do much to 
undermine the assumed regulatory certainty that the new regime is intended 
to deliver.  Deliberations on input methodologies, throughout the reform 
process, have been at a high level of abstraction.  There will be considerable 
devil in the detail of input methodologies and, in time, this will be likely to 
expose the error in the assumption that these methodologies will deliver 
certainty. 
 
Third, appeal rights as are proposed are seriously constrained, and are 
unlikely to deliver an appropriate level of accountability of decision-making.  
The premature and limited nature of appeal rights relating to input 
methodologies means that such appeals must be determined with reference 
to a time frame which is inadequate to assess the application of these 
methodologies.  Further, there will be a considerable tension in the level of 
detail required for input methodologies, and this tension will spill over into 
grounds for appeals of input methodologies, and incentives on the part of the 
Commission to limit its exposure to appeals in the customised proposal 
appeal setting.   
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